I
In his first critique of poetry in Republic, Books II and III, Plato attacks Homer for encouraging in his young hearers and readers patterns of actions and emotions that must be considered morally bad; Homer's poetry instils these patterns in their souls little by little by means of pleasure. In Book III, Plato explicitly speaks of two types of pleasures. There is a first pleasure which we might call the 'pleasure of the images': it seems to consist in the pleasure one takes in poetical images, and, more broadly, in the picturesque language of poems. A second pleasure comes from imitation itself. People, Plato observes, greatly enjoy actors impersonating various characters, and that is the very reason why dramatic poetry, both tragic and comic, is even more enjoyable than epic, which is a mixture combining simple narrative and dramatic enactment. The pleasure of imitation might well explain (although Plato does not explicitly say as much) why we so enjoy the way Homer presents the Olympian gods: they themselves behave like actors, changing their shapes as actors change their masks. This will seem completely harmless to modern ears. Yet combined with the fact that the gods and the Homeric heroes are presented as role models to be 'imitated' or emulated, allowing impressionable children and adolescents to attend such spectacles might prove to be very dangerous entertainment indeed: they would not only enjoy seeing actors (or, in recitations of epic poetry, rhapsodists) imitating gods and heroes, but also, and more crucially, enjoy imitating them, themselves playing, so to speak, the gods and heroes. Such play would tend to make them uncritically absorb their models' values (lying, intemperance, etc.).
In the case of adults, one might think that the situation would be completely different. Enjoying such a pleasure, we moderns might say, should have no consequences for our actual moral natures, at least if we have received a suitable moral education. As a (more or less) morally good person, one may perfectly well enjoy a horror movie in which innocent people are tortured and killed; that pleasure surely will not induce you to become yourself a torturer or a killer. But Plato is less optimistic. In a crucial passage, he emphatically says that his 'greatest charge against poetry' is that 'it can even corrupt morally good people'; this is because, he explains, 'when even the best of us hear Homer, or some other tragic poet, imitating one of the heroes in a state of grief and making a long speech of lamentation ... we enjoy it and give ourselves over to it. We suffer along with the hero (συμπάσχοντες), and take his sufferings seriously. And we praise he who affects us most in this way as a good poet' (X.605c-d).
1 We must take Plato's hypothesis seriously: being a morally good adult might not enable one to resist the potential damage such a spectacle can do to one's soul. While knowing that such spectacles show morally wrong behaviour, we (morally sound) people can't help being 'moved' or 'passionately touched' by them; and, more precisely, we can't help 'suffering along' with those heroes. And here again, pleasure functions as the main vector. The pleasure in question is what we may call an 'emotional pleasure' -a pleasure paradoxically linked to such suffering. (Aristotle will coin this later as 'the pleasure coming from pity and fear through mimesis' (Poet. 14, 1453b12)). Because we so enjoy engaging with such plays, we willy-nilly intend to impersonate the values inherent in the actions presented on stage. Thus, it is no wonder that Plato again ends up firmly condemning pleasure so derived calling it the hēdusmena Mousa: it will cause of 'pleasure and pain [to be] kings in the city instead of law and the thing that has always been generally believed to be best -reason' (X.607a). Plato is here certainly referring to images and songs which are, as it were, the 'flavour enhancer' for poetical pleasure (hēdusma
